



Public Cosmopolitanism vs State Nationalism: A Comparative Study of State and Public Responses to The Gaza Genocide Since 2023

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ABSTRACT

The Israeli intervention that occurred in Gaza in 2023 caused a wave of reactions from countries and the global community, showing differences in orientation and approach. Since the war, the global public has shown a strong reaction to Israeli attacks on civilians and has demanded a ceasefire for humanitarian reasons. In contrast, states have been divided into those who joined to condemn Israel and others who supported Israel. This article comparatively analyses the response of the state and the international public to genocide in Gaza from the perspective of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Nationalism focuses on prioritizing the state interest over others, whereas cosmopolitanism addresses individual rights as the most important thing in global politics. This study uses qualitative methods to interpret the varieties of the states and publics by collecting online documents from websites, journals, and media. This study found that countries tend to act based on national interests, geopolitical considerations, strategic alliances, and domestic stability. Even among Muslim countries and supporters of Palestine, the attitudes shown are often ineffective because they are shackled by domestic political and economic calculations. Instead, the global public displayed strong cosmopolitan solidarity through demonstrations, digital campaigns, and economic boycotts as a form of defence of human rights and universal justice. The tension between a nationalistic approach to the state and a cosmopolitan public response indicates a wide gap between the state and the public stance toward the Gaza genocide.

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INTRODUCTION

The Israeli occupation of Palestine has become one of the most complex and protracted international issues in modern history. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Palestinian territories have undergone systematic colonization, especially after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and the establishment of the British Mandate by the League of Nations. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 became the gateway to the establishment of the State of Israel on Palestinian land, which gradually gave rise to the structural oppression of the Palestinian people (Khalidi, [1991](#)).

The peak of the escalation of violence occurred in 2023 when Israel launched a massive military offensive into the Gaza Strip, which many saw as a form of genocide against Palestinian civilians. Thousands of lives were lost, including those of children and women, and civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, and places of worship was destroyed (Aswar et al., [2025](#)). These facts elicit mixed responses from various countries and the international community.

Nevertheless, the response of countries worldwide to the genocide in Gaza shows contrasting dynamics. Some countries openly support Palestinian independence and strongly condemn Israel's actions, while others support Israel militarily and diplomatically. On the other hand, waves of public solidarity seem massive in various parts of the world, especially through protests, digital campaigns, and pressure on their respective governments to act more decisively (Al Jazeera, [2025](#)).

After the outbreak of the war in Gaza in 2023, various studies have been conducted by researchers from various sides such as analysis related to state policies to the issue or the response of global civil society to Israeli attacks in Gaza, Palestine. Crowley Vigneau, et al., (2025) show widening gap about the crisis of responsibility in multilateral governance with the symbolic politics of state recognition, revealing a widening divide between public-cosmopolitan demands and state-nationalist practice. They examine the applicability of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to Gaza after 7 October 2023 through forty expert interviews across Western and BRICS contexts. They find broad support for applying R2P's first two pillars to protect civilians, alongside anger at Security Council paralysis and perceived double standards that erode the norm's legitimacy and intensify geopolitical fractures. Rather than endorsing coercive intervention, most experts favour non-military pressure and sustained humanitarian access—yet they warn that selective inaction risks hollowing out R2P as a credible global commitment (Crowley-Vigneau, et.al, 2025).

In contrast to the research conducted by Badarin (2024) analyses the wave of 2024 recognitions of Palestine (Ireland, Norway, Spain; plus, several Caribbean states) and argues that recognition functions as performance: narratives, staging, and coordination are designed to influence other governments and reconcile foreign-policy inconsistencies (for example support for territorial integrity in Ukraine versus non-recognition in Palestine). While recognition accrues normative and reputational value, its effects are deeply contingent on absent enforcement or “facts of sovereignty”; European recognition, moreover, may be losing added value amid shifting global power and complicity perceptions in Gaza (Badarin, 2024).

In the context of public response to Gaza, Browne et.al (2025) observe a divergence between the stance of the British government and the British public whereby the government is unable to adopt a firm position despite ongoing crimes against humanity in Gaza, whereas the British public has been outspoken and proactive in supporting the Palestinian cause. The British government responded to the public protests with actions ranging from controlling these movements to openly trying to criminalise and discredit them (Browne, et al., 2025). On the one hand, Ziberi, et al. (2024) focused on the work of humanitarian organisations or NGOs to help civilians in Gaza through their Instagram posts. The NGOs that are studied include ABCD Bethlehem, Islamic Relief USA, Jewish Voice for Peace, MECA (Middle East Children's Association/Alliance), Muslim Hands (UK) that used three main types of appeals in their posts: credibility, emotion, and solidarity. This is often combined in a single post to avoid censorship, counter dominant narratives, and encourage public support for aid and advocacy (Ziberi, et al., 2024).

Hasbi Aswar et.al (2024) studied related to protest actions against Israeli massacre in Gaza in various countries including in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa using the perspective of social movements by mapping various patterns of the movement actions and their impact on increasing global public awareness and suppressing policy makers in their respective countries to be more proactive in supporting Palestine (Aswar et al., 2025). On the other hand, Khairul Munzilin & Elyana Ade Pertiwi (2024) explained the important roles of digital media such as TikTok and Instagram used by pro-Palestinian activists to provide a real picture of Israeli crimes in Palestine and put pressure on state leaders, including international institutions, especially the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Courts (ICC) (Munzilin & Pertiwi, 2025).

Although many have conducted studies on public attitudes and attitudes of various countries towards violence and the genocide of Israel in Palestine from various approaches, the comparison of the attitudes of the state and the public in the context of nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism has not been studied by these researchers. Hence, this paper seeks to fill the gap by studying comparatively public responses and countries by exploring ideas that underlie their stances through the concepts of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Several points will be discussed in this paper, first is a discussion related to the indication of Israeli genocide in Gaza; second, legal and political steps that can be taken

by the United Nations and Middle Eastern countries to respond to the Gaza crisis; Third, the comparative attitude of various countries and public attitudes towards the issue of Gaza; and Fourth is the analysis of differences in state and public attitudes using the concept of nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

METHOD

This study used a qualitative approach with a comparative case study design. This approach was chosen to allow for an in-depth analysis of the differences and similarities between state and societal responses to the genocide in Gaza. This study will examine two categories of countries that support or condemn Israel. The first category will choose the USA, Germany, France, Britain, and India as the main supporting countries to Israel. These countries also are the place of large demonstrations to protest Israel and their governments stance toward Israel. The second category will choose the Gulf Countries including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirate. Some non-Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia are the main players in the Muslim world and are active in advocating the Palestinian issue. Data was collected through the study of official documents such as government statements, voting results in international forums, and foreign policy related to the Gaza conflict. In addition, secondary data from media reports, websites, and journals will be analysed to understand the dynamics and forms of civil society responses. Data analysis was carried out with a thematic approach, which is to group information based on specific patterns such as support, rejection, or neutrality. This approach aims to provide a comprehensive picture of how the country and the public respond to global humanitarian issues, particularly the Gaza genocide tragedy.

This study uses the concepts of nationalism and cosmopolitanism for its analysis. Nationalism and cosmopolitanism are two opposing concepts. Nationalism places love for the homeland, nation, and state as the highest priority, while cosmopolitanism places human beings at the individual and global levels as the highest priority (Yeğenoğlu, [2005](#)).

From the perspective of the nation as the highest authority, nationalism always places the interests of the nation above other interests. In the political context, these glasses will make leaders always prioritize the interests of their nation, or in other words, their national interests in their various political steps. Choosing to contribute to various problems in other nations is still with consideration of the extent to which the attitude benefits or endangers the interests of one's own nation. This concept of nationalism is currently the main hold of various modern nation-states (Paparella, [2023](#)). In contrast, cosmopolitanism exists as a critique of the idea of nationalism, which is considered narrow. Nationalism is not considered good for mankind because it makes a nation indifferent to other nations. Even under certain extreme conditions, the spirit of nationalism encourages racism and colonialism towards other nations.

Therefore, the idea of cosmopolitanism is to invite humanity to manage world politics in the spirit of humanity, not in the interests of a nation that is free, equal, and universally fair without being limited by cultural and religious backgrounds (Singh, [2020](#)). To protect the interests of humanity, cosmopolitanism proposes solutions for global governance (Global Governance), and society (Global Citizen). Global governance refers to global institutions that have the power to force various political authorities to obey global rules. Meanwhile, the global community refers to the awareness of each community's attachment to each other to help and protect each other (Tan, [2012](#)).

In the context of the development of the digital world today, social media - such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are a bridge for the global public in connecting communication between them to fight for the mission of the spread of ideas, fighting for the interests of the global public as a whole and quickly. This phenomenon by Miriam Sobre-Denton ([2015](#)) is referred to as virtual

cosmopolitanism in the sense of efforts to spread culture, ideas, through social media networks to create justice and equality globally (Sobré-Denton, [2015](#)).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Israel's indiscriminate attack on Gaza, which killed civilians, journalists, doctors, and volunteers, led South Africa to file a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on December 29, 2023, claiming that the Israeli military's actions in Gaza violated the 1948 Genocide Convention. This court ordered Israel to stop acts of genocide, prevent killings, severe suffering, and deadly living conditions, and support humanitarian access by January 26, 2024. Allegations of genocide were also conveyed by the UN Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, who concluded that there were "reasonable reasons" to believe that Israel may be committing genocide, in addition to using starvation and systematically destroying medical infrastructure (Albanese, [2024](#)). In addition, Amnesty International, in its December 2024 report, stated that the strategy of mass killings, destruction of the household system, loss of access to aid, and dehumanizing rhetoric according to Amnesty, shows indications of genocide intent (Amnesty International, [2024](#)).

The various conclusions of various institutions on the indications of genocide have always been denied by both Israel and its supporting countries, including the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. However, regardless of whether genocide exists, Israel's atrocities in the war in Gaza are strong indications of violations of civil or non-combatant rights, as stipulated in the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Laws of International War.

In the context of the implementation of these rules, the UN Charter contains clear legal measures to address various humanitarian violations through the authority of the UN Security Council. Chapter VI of the UN Charter states that the Security Council can use diplomacy, mediation, and peace recommendations, while Chapter VII allows the application of legally binding coercive measures, such as embargoes, sanctions, and military intervention, if the situation endangers international peace (United Nations, [1945](#)). The Doctrine of *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P), agreed upon at the 2005 UN Summit, emphasizes that if a country fails to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, the international community is obliged to carry out a collective response, ranging from diplomacy and economic pressure to military force as a last resort (Widagdo & Kurniaty, [2021](#)).

Historically, the UN Security Council has passed several resolutions to create world peace and prevent acts of violence committed between countries, such as the UN Security Council resolution condemning the aggression of North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. The Security Council also passed a resolution when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The resolution mandates member states to use "all necessary means" if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait before January 15, 1991. This became the legal basis for the international coalition in the First Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing a no-fly zone and the use of "all necessary means" to protect Libyan civilians from attacks by the Gaddafi regime. This resolution formed the basis for the NATO-led international military intervention in Libya.

During the Gaza war since 2023, efforts to implement legal measures using the UN charter have been carried out since the start of the war on October 7, 2023, the UN Security Council has held at least 14 votes related to Gaza. Of these, only four resolutions were successfully passed: Resolution 2712 (November 15, 2023), which called for a humanitarian pause to open aid corridors; Resolution 2720 (December 22, 2023), opening border access for fuel, food, and medicine; Resolution 2728 (March 25, 2024), establishing a ceasefire during Ramadan; and a resolution on June 10, 2024, demanding a

ceasefire and the release of hostages. The rest, more than ten drafts, failed, mostly due to US vetoes (about six times) and some by Russia or China.

The US veto is the main obstacle to implementing firm measures to stop the violence that has occurred in Palestine since 2023. Middle Eastern countries have other options to put pressure on Israel, such as imposing economic sanctions, especially countries that have been normalizing relations with Israel or conducting military interventions. Both approaches have been used by Arab countries, such as the political and economic sanctions imposed on Syria during the violence in 2011 by the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Arab coalition also attacked Yemen's Houthi group in 2014 and imposed economic sanctions against Qatar in 2017. All these actions were carried out without the UN Security Council's authorization. Various actions taken by Arab countries to deal with violations or violence in one of the countries in the region can also be used in responding to Israel's violence in the Gaza war since 2023.

In response to Israel's attack on Gaza, there are two major maps of the attitudes of various countries. First, the countries that support Israel include the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. Second, countries are critical but take a limited stance even, maintain official relations with Israel, both diplomatically and economically. The different attitudes of these countries towards Israel are based on the national interests of their respective countries. Countries that are geographically close to Israel, close to the United States and European countries both politically and economically make them tend to limit themselves to behaving towards Israel like the countries of the Middle East and the Islamic world other than in the Middle East.

The first category includes countries that support Israel, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and India. These countries support Israel because of their historical relationship with Israel, which has been supportive of its independence since 1948, and the economic, political, and military cooperation that has been established between them.

The United States was the first country to formally recognize Israel's interim government in 1948. In addition, Israel is a *major non-NATO ally*, which gives it privileged access to advanced weapons systems and military technology from the United States. Since its founding, Israel has received large amounts of economic and military aid from the United States. It is estimated that Israel will receive between US\$310 billion and US\$320 billion (Masters & Merrow, [2024](#)). Therefore, it is difficult for the United States to sever its close ties with Israel. This is because the United States has strategic interests in Israel, including efforts to strengthen its geopolitical influence in the Middle East, support the domestic defence industry that makes great profits, forge alliances based on shared values, intelligence cooperation, and commitment to fighting extremist groups (Vinansia et al., [2025](#)).

In addition, the existence of lobby groups and economic elites of Jewish descent in the United States also plays a role in strengthening this bilateral relationship. Until now, the United States, through Donald Trump's statements, still exists and is consistent in supporting Israel. This can be seen from Trump's statements in the news. In the Israeli-Iranian conflict in June 2025, the United States sides with Israel to provide a counterattack to Iran by sending weapons. The United States did not directly attack Iran. However, U.S. Navy ships and U.S. air defence systems have aided Israel's defence against Iran (Bateman, 2025). This is a form of the United's consistency in providing support to Israel.

In addition to the United States, Britain is an active country that supports Israel. In general, Britain has been very firm in showing its support for Israel to defend itself and continues to export spare parts for F-35 fighter jets to maintain NATO's security and mutual security stability. Since May 2025, the British government has imposed a moratorium on arms exports, frozen free trade

negotiations, and imposed diplomatic sanctions in response to Israeli military actions in Gaza. However, Britain, through its Prime Minister Keir Starmer, has firmly shown its support for Israel.

Britain's current stance towards Israel is that it still supports and supplies weapons. The British High Court ruled that the export of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel remains legally valid, considering that the move has strategic value for the UK's national security interests by strengthening defence cooperation. F-35 fighter jets are Israel's mainstay in striking various regions of the Middle East (Santosa, [2025](#)). Although the British High Court ruled that Israel did not exercise its international legal obligations to protect the rights of the Palestinian people, the United Kingdom still granted an exception for the export of F-35 fighter jets. He argued that stopping the ban on the export of F-35 fighter jet parts would disrupt global programs and international security. In addition, this is considered to endanger the security of the UK and the international community.

France has also taken a similar stance in supporting Israel in the ongoing war. Since 1949, France has been one of the first countries in Europe to recognize the existence of Israel. In its official statement, France expressed support for Israel's "right to live in security." France also expressed concern over the humanitarian situation faced by Palestinian civilians. This certainly shows the existence of France's national interests in Israel. France's attitude reflects its national interest in maintaining a domestic political balance between the Jewish and Muslim diaspora communities. Second, it must maintain its role as a global actor with the capacity to mediate in the region. Third, strengthening cooperation in the intelligence and military fields, including involvement in the international coalition against ISIS. French President Emmanuel Macron also conveyed that France would defend Israel if it was attacked by Iran. France, considering its assets, will participate in operations to protect and defend Israel. However, France will not participate in operations that are "offensive" in the Israeli-Iranian conflict (Antara News, [2025](#)). This is a form of France's consistency in supporting Israel.

India is one of the Asian countries that supports Israel. This is especially true since the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 1992. This bilateral relationship has strengthened under Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This was marked by frequent visits and meetings between the two countries in 2017 and 2018. India's closeness to Israel has also been observed in recent years. India has grown closer to Israel since the Hamas attack in October 2023 (tvOneNews, [2025](#)). This certainly shows that India has strategic interests in Israel. India's national interest in Israel focuses on two main aspects: first, in the field of defence and technology, where Israel is an important supplier to India, especially in drone technology, radar, intelligence, and missile defence systems. In Asia, India is Israel's largest supporter and the third largest in the world in terms of Israeli arms purchases after Azerbaijan and Vietnam, according to the SIPRI 2024 report (Muhaimin, [2025](#)). Second, the Modi government's nationalist ideology is similar to the Israeli model of nationalism. This makes Israel a strategic partner for India. This is reflected in public opinion in India, which tends to be pro-Israel. A 2009 survey showed that 58% of the Indian public was sympathetic to Israel, the highest percentage globally.

Nevertheless, India, as a leader of *the Global South*, continues to maintain diplomatic communication with Arab and Palestinian countries, including Iran, to ensure its national energy interests. The attitude of Israeli-Indian closeness can also be seen in Israel's assistance in the India-Pakistan conflict. Israel expressed strong support for India after the Indian Army launched a series of strikes on sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (tvOneNews, [2025](#)). For Israel, India has the right to defend itself against this attack. These words came after India carried out the "Operation Sindoor" attack. This form of support clearly shows that the cooperation between Israel and India is very close and has a positive impact on both countries.

The second category of states' attitudes toward Israel are those that are critical but take a limited stance. This attitude is generally adopted by Muslim countries in the Middle East and non-Middle East. Since the beginning of the war, Arab countries have condemned Israel's attacks, including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran. However, some of these countries also choose not to take a firm stance against Israel, for example, taking a tougher approach to Israel, but instead continue to establish economic cooperation with Israel.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have consistently condemned Israel's military aggression against the Palestinians and called for an end to the violence. This is evidenced by the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Doha in October 2024 to conduct a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon and voice their concerns over the escalation of the conflict. The GCC countries have been vocal in condemning Israel's violence and diplomatically supporting a ceasefire. However, on the one hand, the GCC is also not firm due to its dependence on the United States, due to the existence of a regional alliance framework, and normalization (UAE/Bahrain/Saudi). This is because the GCC has several interests, namely, in the form of republic security through the US and defence systems, containing Iranian influence, and economic and technological interests, both regional and international.

For example, Bahrain has publicly condemned Israel's aggression against the Gaza Strip and called for a ceasefire. Nevertheless, since 2020, the country has maintained normalised diplomatic relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. On the one hand, Bahrain provides space for people to voice their anger through demonstrations and official statements supporting Palestine. In contrast, the government maintains formal relations with Israel. Although the value of bilateral trade is relatively small, at around 30 million USD since 2021, this decision is driven more by strategic considerations, such as maintaining a balance in relations with the United Arab Emirates and reducing economic dependence on Saudi Arabia (Cornwell, [2023](#)). Parliamentary statements, such as those delivered by Mamdooh Al-Saleh regarding the repatriation of the Israeli Ambassador, seem to be more of a response to public pressure than a representation of official royal policy (Cornwell, [2023](#)). This indicates an ambiguity between political rhetoric and the implementation of foreign policy, which remains controlled by the monarchical authority.

Meanwhile, Kuwait has taken the toughest position among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states by consistently rejecting normalization, banning economic cooperation with Israel, and actively condemning Israeli military attacks. This attitude is motivated by a commitment to maintain pro-Palestinian national unity and an image of an Arab state that consistently supports Palestinian independence. Nevertheless, Kuwait remains dependent on US security cooperation with the United States for regional stability (Al-Monitor, [2023](#)). Oman has also rejected Israeli violence and is actively channelling humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, Oman maintains informal communication with Israel to maintain its role as a neutral mediator in regional dynamics between the Gulf, Iran, and Western countries (Khalid, [2025](#)).

Qatar occupies an active position in supporting Palestinians, especially through its role as a mediator between Hamas and Israel and the continuous distribution of humanitarian aid. However, Qatar also maintains strategic relations with the United States, including the presence of a US military base in Doha. This position reflects Qatar's efforts to maintain a global image as a strategic regional diplomatic actor while maintaining domestic economic stability, especially in the energy sector (Cornwell, [2024](#)).

Saudi Arabia rhetorically condemned the Israeli attack and suspended the normalization process, which had previously been mediated by the United States. However, Saudi Arabia's move remains calculative, as normalization is considered a strategic instrument for obtaining technology

transfer and long-term security guarantees. The Kingdom's main interest lies in the transformation of the national economy through Vision 2030 and strengthening its regional position in the face of Iranian influence (Cornwell, [2025](#)).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the first GCC country to normalize relations with Israel. The UAE has consistently condemned Israel's violence but has not taken steps to cut diplomatic ties. This attitude is mainly driven by enormous economic interests, including access to Israeli technology, trade, and investment, which are considered crucial to the transformation of the non-oil and gas economy. The UAE seeks to strengthen its position as a regional financial, technological, and tourism hub and forge close alliances with the US and Israel for national stability and modernization (Cornwell, [2025](#)).

Jordan occupies a sensitive position in this conflict, given its status as a country with a formal peace treaty with Israel since 1994. Jordan has consistently condemned Israeli military aggression and supports a two-state solution. However, more decisive diplomatic measures are difficult to take because Jordan has responsibilities as the manager of the Islamic holy site in East Jerusalem, as well as domestic sensitivities, given the country's large population of Palestinian descent. Dependence on economic aid from the US and the European Union was also a limiting factor in Jordan's response (Armitage, [2023](#)).

Egypt played a vital role as a mediator between Hamas and Israel and was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Egypt officially condemned Israel's aggression and called for a ceasefire to be declared. However, Egypt's position remains moderate owing to its dependence on economic and military aid from the United States and the importance of maintaining national security stability in the Sinai Peninsula. Control of the Rafah crossing also makes Egypt an important actor in Gaza's dynamics while maintaining its relevance in regional diplomacy.

Iran has taken the toughest stance against Israel, rejecting the existence of the state of Israel and providing active support to resistance groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. However, Iran is not directly involved in an open war with Israel, given the high risk of direct conflict that could worsen domestic conditions and accelerate economic collapse due to international sanctions. Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric functions more as an instrument of domestic and regional legitimacy while maintaining boundaries so that conflicts do not extend directly to its territory (Becatoros, [2025](#)).

Indonesia has consistently voiced its support for Palestinian independence and condemned Israeli aggression. Although it does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, Indonesia has not taken more concrete steps in the form of direct economic pressure. This attitude reflects the government's efforts to balance moral commitment to the Palestinian issue with the pragmatic interest of maintaining economic stability and broad international relations, including with partners of countries that have good relations with Israel (Wienanto, [2025](#)).

Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is one of the countries that took concrete steps by severing all trade relations with Israel in May 2024. This step was taken in response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Rafah and Israel's rejection of a ceasefire. The Turkish government stated that trade relations would only resume if Israel allowed adequate humanitarian aid and imposed a permanent ceasefire on the conflict. This decision reflects Turkey's firm position, which distinguishes it from most other Muslim countries, which are more cautious.

Global Public Response Map

In contrast to the responses of various countries that are pro-Israel or take a critical stance, the global public response is overwhelmingly critical of Israel. The same response comes from the public, either from pro-Israel countries in America and Europe or from Muslim countries that are critical of Israel.

These protests took place on various continents and in cities around the world, demonstrating with the slogan "*Free Palestine*" as a form of humanitarian support and concern for the calamity experienced by Palestinians. Data collection by ACLED was carried out from the first three weeks of Israel's attack on Palestine, namely from October 7-27, 2023. It was recorded that protests have occurred in the Middle East and North Africa, with as many as 1,400 demonstration activities in Yemen, 490 in Turkey, 357 in Iran with 276 activities and Morocco with 267 in Morocco. Meanwhile, according to Al Jazeera, protests that occurred in Africa and the Middle East occurred in 8 countries and 8 cities, namely in Egypt (Cairo), South Africa (Cape Town), Morocco (Rabat), Jordan (Amman), Iraq (Baghdad), Lebanon (Beirut), Bahrain (Manama) and Iran (Tehran) (Ali, [2023](#))

The demonstrations that took place in Morocco and Bahrain demanded the cancellation of the normalization of their governments' relations with Israel, which is considered responsible for the oppression of Palestinians. In Cairo, they raised a giant flag in downtown Cairo and shouted opposition to the Israeli occupation of Muscat (Yee, [2023](#)). In Lebanon, protesters gathered in front of the French embassy building to express their frustration over international support for Israel. They called on French president Emmanuel Macron and the rest of the international community to take stronger measures against the protection of Human Rights.

Protests in Europe took place in various countries and cities, namely Spain (Barcelona), Greece (Athens), Switzerland (Geneva), Germany (Berlin), England (Cambridge, London, and Manchester), Denmark (Copenhagen), Turkey (Diyarbakir and Istanbul), Italy (Milan, Paris, Rome, and Turin), the Netherlands (The Hague), Ireland (Dublin), and Scotland (Edinburgh and Glasgow) (Ali, [2023](#)). In Rome, protesters numbering nearly a thousand carried out their actions holding posters that read "*Palestine, Rome is with you*" and "*No Peace until we get freedom*". In Germany, protests by civil society were held in Adenauer Platz Square. The demonstrators criticised Germany's pro-Israel stance. The protesters carried posters that read "*Cease-fire now*" and "*Stop the Genocide*". In London, England, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of the city centre to call for a permanent ceasefire (Hui, [2023](#)).

Asian countries have also not been absent from holding protests Israel's attacks on Gaza. Protests in Asia also occurred in many countries, such as Sri Lanka (Colombo), India (Delhi, Hyderabad, Kargil, Kolkata, Lucknow, Mumbai, Pune, and Thiruvananthapuram), Pakistan (Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore), Bangladesh (Dhaka), South Korea (Seoul), Japan (Tokyo), Syria (Damascus), Palestine (Nablu), Yemen (Sana'a), Indonesia (Jakarta and Surakarta), and Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) (Ali, [2023](#)). Of all the countries in Asia, *the World Socialist Web Site* (WSWS) noted that as of November 6, 2023, one of the largest protests in Asia occurred in Indonesia. This demonstration was held on Sunday, November 5, 2023, at the National Monument Field (Monas), Jakarta. The rally was attended by hundreds of thousands of people who gathered to protest by waving Palestinian flags and demanding a ceasefire. Meanwhile, in Indonesia's neighbouring country, Malaysia, people protested by gathering at a football stadium in Terengganu and raising the "*Free Palestine*" flag as a form of support (McGrath, [2023](#)).

In the Americas, civil society also demonstrated against the tyranny committed by Israel, such as in the United States (Boston, Dallas, Dearborn, LA, New York, Pittsburgh, Tucson, Washington), Brazil (Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo), Canada (Calgary, Edmonton, Mississauga, Montreal, Vancouver), Venezuela (Cape Town, Caracas), and Chile (Santiago) (Ali, [2023](#)). Protests carried out in Latin American regions, such as Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia, demanded a ceasefire and freedom for Palestinians by flying Palestinian flags (Dogan, [2024](#)).

In Washington, USA, thousands of demonstrators gathered opposite the White House at Freedom Plaza. The narratives they voiced questioned the feasibility of President Joe Biden as a presidential candidate at that time. Demonstrators held up posters that read "*No votes for Genocide*"

Joe," *"Biden has blood on his hands,"* and *"Let Gaza live"* (Jackman et al., 2024). Jews in America have also participated in protests the Israeli government's crimes against Palestinians, such as the Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) group, which actively supports Palestine by regularly carrying out actions that are attended by hundreds of demonstrations in the United States. The JVP group has also sent hundreds of thousands of letters to politicians in the United States including President Joe Biden and group leaders since the Israeli-Palestinian war since the 7 October 2023.

Australia is also the venue for civilian protests Israel's attacks on Gaza. The action took place in two countries and seven cities, namely Australia (Brisbane, Adelaide, Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide) and New Zealand (Auckland) (Ali, 2023). Demonstrators gathered in major Australian cities such as Sydney and Melbourne. They have been in action for weeks, calling for a permanent ceasefire by raising flags, banners, and placards as high as possible with the slogans *"Free Palestine"* and *"stop genocide now"*. The protests carried out by Australians were condemned and threatened by the Australian authorities. The authorities' response to the protests was to impose arbitrary restrictions or arrests on demonstrators deemed peaceful.

Internally, there have also been demonstrations carried out by Israelis both inside and outside Israel, such as thousands of Israelis who demonstrated in Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities to call for a ceasefire, an end to the crime of genocide, and demand that Benjamin Netanyahu (Israeli Prime Minister) step down from government (Al Jazeera, 2024). The protesters demanded the signing of an immediate agreement with Palestinian resistance groups to exchange captured Israelis for prisoners in Israeli prisons. The state media reported that thousands of protesters demonstrated and blocked roads, many carrying banners reading *"Please," "Take (them) home"* and *"Exchange hostages now!"*. Anti-Netanyahu demonstrations have become commonplace in Tel Aviv, and other Israeli-occupied cities. The protesters demanded the prime minister's resignation for his failure to repatriate the prisoners (Rostanti, 2024).

Not only protests, but the global community has also petitioned to call for an Israel-Gaza ceasefire, as in the UK since October 16, 2023, until now, this petition has received as many as 466,416 signatures by the people of London and globally. In Indonesia, a public petition was also carried out in support of South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) since January 5, 2024, and this petition received 62,677 signatures.

One of the massive issues as part of the protests the Israeli massacre is the emergence of calls to boycott products that are tied to Israel. The call for a boycott echo globally, both in the Islamic world and in Europe, America, Africa, and other countries. In Indonesia, the boycott action was strengthened by the issuance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 regarding the law supporting the Palestinian cause. This fatwa regulates the provisions of the law, one of which is that helping to fight for Palestinian independence against Israeli colonialism is a legal obligation. This fatwa also regulates recommendations, one of which is that Muslims are urged to avoid making transactions and using products that are affiliated with or support colonialism; some of these products include McDonald's, Starbucks, Burger King, Coca-Cola, and Pepsi (N, 2023).

In the Middle East, there has been a boycott campaign against several products in the Middle East region. In Jordan, people boycott McDonald's and Starbucks products, in Kuwait City people boycott McDonald's and Starbucks products and KFC, in Rabat, Morocco as well, people boycott McDonald's products, in Egypt, people also boycott McDonald's and Starbucks products (Saafan & Al-Khalidi, 2023).

Social media is one of the most important means for the world public to voice their concerns about the citizens of Gaza, Palestine. Photos and videos of Israeli violence were widely circulated by netizens worldwide. Through social media, activists and other figures criticised Israel.

The Indonesian and Malaysian public even specifically introduced the *Julid Fi Sabilillah* movement, which was called on Twitter to fight against Zionism and Israel by creating counter-narratives. This movement was carried out by Indonesian and Malaysian netizens as an effort to fight against Zionism and Israel on social media. The object of *Julid Fi Sabilillah* was the Israeli army, police officers, and Israeli citizens on social media (Saputra, 2024). *Julid Fi Sabilillah's* actions were carried out by terrorizing the Israeli military's social media accounts, which were accompanied by various sharp comments. These actions proved to be effective, weakening the targeted accounts and causing the account owners to be threatened and disturbed, resulting in many Israeli soldiers expressing anxiety and complaints because of the sharp words that were able to successfully bring them down mentally.

Comparative Analysis of State and Public Response to the Gaza Genocide

The response to the ongoing humanitarian tragedy in Gaza since 2023 highlights the gap between the state's response and that of the global civil society. When analysed in the framework of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, it is clear that there is a conflict of perspectives between the interests of the state, which tend to maintain the logic of political and economic interests, and public solidarity, which prioritizes universal human values.

Nationalism is the main foundation for the formulation of foreign policy in many countries. Within this framework, international political decisions are often not based on ethical considerations but rather on direct benefits to national stability and interests. The attitudes of countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and India reflect this approach. They maintain support for Israel based on military alliances, domestic political influence, and concerns for regional stability, despite numerous credible reports pointing to gross human rights violations in Gaza. These countries place Israel's "right of self-defence" as the main argument while ignoring the collective suffering of Palestinian civilians.

The attitude of prioritizing national interests is also adopted by Muslim-majority countries or countries that rhetorically support Palestine. Despite strong statements, humanitarian aid deliveries, and solidarity diplomacy, many of these countries have failed to exert effective political and economic pressure on Israel. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. Despite openly condemning Israel's aggression in Gaza and distributing aid, it maintains economic and security ties with parties allied to Israel, including the United States. Egypt, for example, plays a key role in managing the Rafah border but has often slowed access to humanitarian aid in Gaza due to internal security considerations. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to pursue a pragmatic diplomatic agenda, prioritizing regional stability, Iranian threats, and long-term trade agreements over concrete pressure on Israel.

Another relevant example is Turkey's stance. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has been vocal in condemning Israel's actions and even halted trade with Israel in May 2024. However, before such a step was taken, trade relations between the two countries remained active for months amid military aggression. This shows that although Turkey wants to position itself as a defender of Palestine in the eyes of the Muslim world, its approach is controlled by domestic and international strategic calculations.

Jordan, which historically has a large population of Palestinians and a region that borders directly with Israel, also faces a similar dilemma. The country withdrew its ambassador and cancelled the energy cooperation agreement in protest but remained bound by the peace agreement it had signed in 1994. Jordan's efforts to pressure Israel are carried out more through soft diplomatic channels because of its attachment to the United States as a key partner in military and economic aid.

In contrast, the international public has given a very different and more decisive response in showing solidarity with the people of Gaza. In various countries and cities worldwide, large waves of demonstrations have emerged, ranging from London, New York, Berlin, to Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Cape Town. Thousands and even millions of people took to the streets, demanding an end to the genocide and support for the Palestinians. The public organised a global boycott of products associated with Israel. Cries such as "*Free Palestine*" or "*Ceasefire Now*" echoed on social media, sports stadiums, public spaces, and places of worship. In Indonesia, the Indonesian Ulema Council issued a special fatwa in support of the Palestinian cause and called for a boycott of products affiliated with Israel.

In the context of cosmopolitanism, these public actions reflect the emergence of awareness among *global citizens* who feel morally and ethically connected to the suffering of fellow human beings, regardless of national boundaries or ethnic and religious backgrounds. This public solidarity transcends national boundaries and demonstrates that human values cannot be limited by geopolitical interests. Movements such as *Julid Fi Sabilillah*, which was launched by Indonesian and Malaysian netizens through social media, are an example of how civil society can create psychological and symbolic pressure on the Israeli army and its supporters directly through digital platforms. Social media has become the most effective tool today to spread ideas and protest globally related to Israeli atrocities in Palestine. It shows the power of virtual cosmopolitanism as a means for the global public to communicate with each other and to fight together for global justice and equality.

This tension between state and public logic suggests that nationalism, which prioritizes narrow national interests, is often at odds with the cosmopolitan values associated with global justice, cross-national solidarity, and respect for human rights. Although many countries, including Muslim countries, symbolically side with the Palestinians, their actions are often ineffective as they are held hostage by international political realities, economic pressures, and domestic stability, which remain top priorities. Meanwhile, the public continues to urge the state to act more boldly and decisively in accordance with global moral principles.

The response to the genocide in Gaza reveals a fundamental difference between a state approach that is still dominated by nationalistic considerations and a public approach that reflects the spirit of global cosmopolitanism. This indicates the importance of transforming the country's nationalistic attitude towards the protection of humanitarian interests. This attitude of the state, which prioritizes national interests, is what makes the conditions in Gaza worse. For example, if Middle Eastern countries want to take a firm stance to pressure Israel, the impact will be better on the current conditions in Gaza and Palestine.

CONCLUSION

The response to the genocide that has taken place in Gaza since 2023 shows a sharp contrast between the state's approach and the global public reaction. Countries that openly support Israel and those that symbolically voice support for the Palestinians generally remain bound by the calculation of national interests. Geopolitical, economic, domestic stability, and strategic alliance pressures are the main factors limiting attitudes. Even Muslim-majority countries are unlikely to take concrete or decisive steps to put pressure on Israel politically or economically, even though they rhetorically condemn the military aggression that has occurred in Palestine.

In contrast, the international public exhibited strong moral cosmopolitanism, with waves of solidarity actions that transcended the boundaries of state, religion, and political identity. Mass demonstrations, product boycotts, digital campaigns, and public petitions are tangible expressions of global concern for justice and human rights. The public from all over the world is demanding an end

to the genocide and showing a commitment to the suffering of the Palestinian people, regardless of national affiliation.

The tension between nationalistic state interests and cosmopolitan public voices is an important lesson in global political governance. It pointed out that the current international system is not fair enough to respond to crimes against humanity if it relies only on the logic of the state. Therefore, there needs to be a great impetus for countries to listen more to the voices of their people and shape foreign policies that are not solely based on political pragmatism but also on cosmopolitan ethics and the principle of universal humanity. Nonetheless, this study is still at the level of comparing state and public responses by only taking some examples. For further research, it is recommended to explore the states that have changed their positions to be more critical of Israel after being protested by their internal publics. Also, the dynamic of the internal protests in the Muslim world and non-western countries or the global south are still not widely discussed. Afterall, this research is expected to contribute to enhance studies on Palestine and to be the intellectual contribution to support the Palestine struggle for their independence.

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